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The two year period covered by this survey has brought little statutory
change in the Florida Workmen's Compensation Law.' Judicial decision
has, however, broadened and in some respects restricted various sections of
the act.2
No statutory changes were accomplished by the 1961 Florida Legisla-
ture concerning the substantive benefits conferred by the act upon injured
or disabled workmen. This session of the legislature did change the status
of Deputy Commissioners from part-time deputies to full-time deputies with
allowance to the Florida Industrial Commission to designate any attorney
employed by it to serve as a deputy pro hac vice, or on a temporary basis
where the need exists.' Further authority was given to the Commission
in the administration of, and claims filed. against, the special disability
fund.4 Additional changes were made under the section covering safety
rules and provisions.5
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
Coverage under the Florida Workmen's Compensation Law" is afforded
to employees of the state, its political subdivisions, and to all private employ-
ments when three or more employees are employed by the same employer. 7
Occasional employment of the statutory minimum number of employees
will not bring the employer under the act.8 In determining the status of
individuals as employers or employees, the courts have penetrated the veil
of fictitious arrangements9 and have enforced responsibility on employers
* Member of the Florida Bar.
1. FLA. STAT. ch. 440 (1961).
2. This survey covers the legislative changes by the 1961 session of the Florida
Legislature and judicial decisions reported from volume 112, Southern Reporter, second
series (June 1959) to volume 130, Southern Reporter, second series (June 1961). For
prior survey articles see Burton, Florida Workmen's Compensation 1935 to 1950, 5 MIAMI
L. Q. 74 (1950); Clements, Workmen's Compensation, 8 MIAMI L. Q. 469 (1954);
and Schroll, Workmen's Compensation-1954-1959, 14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 154 (1959).
3. FLA. STAT. § 440.45 (1961).
4. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(5)(d)8 (1961).
5. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.56(1), (8)(a), (11) (1961).
6. FLA. STAT. ch. 440 (1961).
7. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.02(1) (b) 1, 2 (1961); GoGo Mobile Motor Car Corp. v.
Harrison, 125 So.2d 571 (Fla. 1960). Florida coverage denied: Ray-Hof Agencies, Inc.
v. Petersen, 123 So.2d 251 (Fla. 1960). The law in effect at the time of employment is
part of the contract of employment; Hyatt v. Armstrong Cork Co., 121 So.2d 793
(Fla. 1960).
8. Mathers v. Sellers, 113 So.2d 443 (Fla. App. 1959).
9. Gray v. Hull, 114 So.2d 176 (Fla. App. 1959).
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when equitable circumstances have dictated.10 Similarly, coverage under the
act has been denied to those who were, in fact, not employees;" and it was
also denied when the employee's alleged disability had no relationship to
his status as an employee.1
2
Coverage has been denied for damage to artificial members or pros-
thetic devices under the theory that they are personal property and not
part of the person,13 but it was extended to cover the natural consequences
which flow from medical treatment for an injury under the theory of liberal
construction. 14 The theory of coverage for new injuries which result as a
natural consequence of the original injury was held inapplicable in Johnnie's
Produce Co. v. Benedict 6 Jordan15 wherein the chain of natural conse-
quence was broken by the injured employee's own act of negligence.
In Lobnitz v. Orange Memorial Hosp.,16 coverage was denied for the
period of time the injured workman made no attempt to secure medical
treatment; the court held that there was an obligation to minimize damages
which the claimant failed to do.' 7
When the vexing problem of dual insurance coverage exists, the Florida
Industrial Commission has been held to have the power to interpret the
intent of the parties to the insurance contract.'8 In City of Lakeland v.
Catinella'9 the claimant sustained two separate injuries with the same
employer. Insurance coverage had changed after the first accident. The
carrier who covered the first accident made payments for the second. Sub-
sequently it sought determination of its responsibility and also sought reim-
bursement for compensation benefits paid for which the second carrier was
responsible. At the time the second accident occurred, there was no statu-
tory provision giving the Commission jurisdiction to determine this action.
However, prior to the time the first carrier made a claim against the second
(creating a controversy) a provision was passed giving this jurisdiction to
the Commission.20 The supreme court held that the law in effect at the
10. Dyalwood, Inc. v. Thomas, 122 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1960). For placing responsi-
bility when subcontractor contracts out work see Fidelity Constr. Co. v. Arthur I. Collins
& Son, Inc., 130 So.2d 612 (Fla. 1961).
11. Adams v. Wagner, 129 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1961); Florida Industrial Comm'n v.
Schoenberg, 117 So.2d 538 (Fla. App. 1960).
12. City of Hialeah v. Warner, 128 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1961).
13. Southern Elec. Inc. v. Spa]], 130 So.2d 279 (Fla. 1961).
14. Royal Palm Mkt. v. Lutz, 126 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1961); Ortkiese v. Clarson &
Ewell Eng'r, 126 So.2d 556 (Fla. 1961). Evidence insufficient to show natural conse-
quence: Jarvis v. Miami Retreat Foundation, 128 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1961).
15. 120 So.2d 12 (Fla. 1960).
16. 126 So.2d 739 (Fla. 1961).
17. Violation of a safety rule without a showing of willful refusal to observe it was
held insufficient to deny coverage in Smit v. Geyer Detective Agency, Inc., 130 So.2d
882 (Fla. 1961).
18. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. King, 114 So.2d 184 (Fla. App. 1959).
19. 129 So.2d 133 (Fla. 1961).
20. FLA. STAT. § 440.42(3) (1961).
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time the controversy arose governed, and that apportionment of responsi-
bility as between the two carriers also was determined as of this date.
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
In order to invoke the benefits afforded by the act, there must be some
connection between the employment and the injury. An employee who
threw a cherry bomb after an unsuccessful fishing trip and lost an eye as a
result of the explosion was held to be entitled to compensation, because
the fishing trip was designed to entertain the employer's customers. 21 How-
ever, an employee who turned to acknowledge a call from a fellow employee
and fell, injuring his back, was denied benefits for failure to show that the
injury arose out of the employment; 22 while a claimant who was attacked
and beaten by a fellow employee found to be an aggressor, did recover
benefits under the act.
2 .
When the connection with the employment is remote the courts have
denied benefits, 24 but when substantial proof is submitted of facts warranting
a reasonable inference that the employee was engaged in the employer's
business at the time of the accident, recovery is allowed.
25
DISABILITY BENEFITS
Perhaps the most important judicial decision rendered in the period
surveyed was the supreme court decision in the case of Southern Bell Tel.
6 Tel. Co. v. Bell,26 which reversed a decision of a district court of appeal.
2 ;
Based on a rebuttable presumption that loss of earning capacity is equal to
the permanent physical functional impairment, a Deputy Commissioner
awarded compensation for a permanent partial disability for a twenty per
cent loss of future earning capacity even though the permanently injured
employee was receiving more money from his employer for his post injury
endeavors. The presumption is known as the Marsiglia Rule which evolved
from an Industrial Commission decision. 2 In reversing the district court
of appeal, the supreme court overruled the presumption and remanded the
21. Boyd v. Florida Mattress Factory, Inc., 128 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1961) (the act of
horseplay not being sufficient deviation).
22. Vander Linden v. Reed Constr. Corp., 115 So.2d 706 (Fla. App. 1959).
23. W. T. Edwards Hosp. v. Rakestraw, 114 So.2d 802 (Fla. App. 1959).
24. Aggravation of a heart condition was held noncompensable when working
conditions demonstrated no exposure to danger not ordinarily risked by the public in
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hudson, 112 So.2d 29 (Fla. App. 1959). See also
Continental Turpentine & Rosin Corp. v. Palmer, 129 So.2d 409 (Fla. 1961); United
States Fid. & Guar.,Co. v. Rowe, 126 So.2d 737 (Fla. 1961); Seabreeze Indus., Inc. v.
Phily, 118 So.2d 54 (Fla. App. 1960).
25. Johnson v. Koffee Kettle Restaurant, 125 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1960).
26. 116 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1959).
27. 108 So.2d 483 (Fla. App. 1959); see Scbroll, Workmen's Comjensation-1954.
1959, 14 U. MIAMI L. REv. 154, 161 (1959).
28. Marsiglia v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 1 Fla. Comp. R. 77, cert. denied without
opinion, 85 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1955).
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cause to the Deputy for decision without the aid of a presumption in the
proof of loss of wage earning capacity. The "open labor market" test was,
however, approved while increased post injury earnings were held to be
only a factor in determining wage earning capacity loss. Subsequently, in
Horace Z. Brunson Plumbing (5 Heating Co. v. Mellander,29 the court
stated that the intent of the act is to compensate for loss of wage earning
capacity not loss of wages, and that any wage loss by the injured party
while he is still temporarily disabled is not proof of permanent disability
under the act.
The test of loss of wage earning capacity applies only to body in juries. 30
Where the "body" ends and scheduled members begin-' has also been the
topic of judicial interpretation; shoulder cuff injuries and a complete tear
of the long head of the biceps tendon both have been held to be body
injuries.
3 2
Of equal importance to scheduled injury claims is the decision in
Magic City Bottle 6' Supply Co. v. Robinson.3 3 There the court affirmed
an award of a thirty-five per cent loss of the use of a foot when the medical
impairment ratings were five per cent. It was stated that economic factors
may be considered. Medical opinion was held not to be conclusive and in
proper cases, greater weight may be given to lay testimony. The impact
of this decision and the Bell decision was to take the scepter from the
medical profession and return it to the Deputy Commissioner.
Disability benefits prior to the award of permanency also have been
touched upon by the courts. Temporary total disability was again defined
as the healing period, during which one is totally disabled, unable to work
and recovery is reasonably expected. 34 An award of temporary partial dis-
ability was affirmed when an employee ceased work due to back pain and
became a full time student, the fact of the full time student activity not
barring recovery.,"
In claims for death benefits 3; by alleged dependents actual dependency
must be shown. In MacDon Lumber Co. v. Stevenson37 a mother was
denied benefits on the basis of a lack of dependency on her deceased 171/2
29. 130 So.2d 273 (Fla. 1961).
30. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(u) (1961); see also Port Everglades Terminal Co. v.
Canty, 120 So.2d 596 (Fla. 1960).
31. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.15(3)(a)-(s) (1961).
32. Jewell v. Wood, 130 So.2d 277 (Fla. 1961); Hernandez v. DeCarlo, 116 So.2d
429 (Fla. 1959).
33. 116 So.2d 240 (Fla. 1959).
34. Kirkland v. Benedict & Jordan, 120 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1960).
35. Underwood v. Terminal-Frouge Builders, 128 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1961); see also
Cheyney v. Grossberger, 115 So.2d 193 (Fla. App. 1959) for a well reasoned opinion
dissenting from a denial of temporary disability benefits.
36. FLA. STAT. § 440.16 (1961).
37. 117 So.2d 487 (Fla. 1960); In King v. Keller, 117 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1960) two
widows competed for death benefits. The cause was remanded for more evidence.
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year old son who had worked only one day with the employer when he was
killed. The deceased had had no steady prior employment. The court
set forth the elements necessary for dependency and stated that a partial
dependent would receive full dependent benefits.
MEDICAL BENEFITS
In Cook v. Georgia Grocery, Inc.,8 a Deputy Commissioner awarded
payment for home nursing care for a completely incapacitated workman.
The award was reversed by the full Commission which found the award
to be excessive when compared to the alleged cost of providing the same
services by a nursing home. The Commission allowed these costs only.
On certiorari, the supreme court quashed the order of the full Commission,
reinstated the award of the Deputy, and held there to be no monetary limit
on medical care. 9
ArORNEYs' FEES
The attorneys' fees section of the act 40 has been frequently attacked
during the period surveyed. Although recognizing the experience of agencies
assessing fees as well as the importance of the record in determining value
of services rendered, the supreme court held in Florida Silica Sand Co. v.
Parker41 that there must be evidence as to the reasonable value of attorneys'
fees either by testimony or affidavit. Various fee schedules were mentioned
and Canon 12 of the Code of Ethics was stated to be a safe guide. Con-
tingent future recovery was held to be an unrealistic basis for an attorney's
fee in Port Everglades Terminal Co. v. Canty.
42
Injured workmen are now obligated to pay their own attorneys when
their claim is accepted by the employer or carrier within twenty-one days
after it is filed with the Industrial Commission. In Carillon Hotel v.
Rodriguez48 the court held the twenty-one day rule applicable even though
the employer and carrier were aware of the claimant's lost time, due to
an industrial accident, for a twenty-one day period prior to the time
the claimant hired an attorney who filed the claim. 44
The assessment of an attorney's fee was denied when no application
was made for more than a year after the court had determined the cause. 45
38. 125 So.2d 837 (Fla. 1960).
39. See also Brown v. Dennis, 114 So.2d 335 (Fla. App. 1959) (court increased
nursing services from $40.00 to $50.00 per week); Board of County Comm'rs v. McLain,
129 So.2d 422 (Fla. 1961) (in reference to drug reimbursements).
40. FLA. STAT. § 440.34 (1961).
41. 118 So.2d 2 (Fla. 1960); see also Standard Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Reppa,
122 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1960).
42. 120 So.2d 596 (Fla. 1960).
43. 124 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1960).
44. This case was followed in Comfort Springs of Florida v. Laiche, 125 So.2d 574
(Fla. 1960); as to what constitutes a "claim" see Florida Tel. Corp. v. Oliver, 126 So.2d
885 (Fla. 1961).
45. Andrews v. C.B.S. Div., Maule Indus., 129 So.2d 132 (Fla. 1961).
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These fees were similarly denied for prohibition proceedings under the
theory that it was not a review of the award under the statute. 41
PROCEDURE'
The authority of the Deputy Commissioner as the sole finder of fact
and that of the full Commission as an appellate review body has been
reaffirmed on numerous occasions.47 The Deputy Commissioner must
consider all of the evidence presented to him and his findings must accord
with logic and reason.48 Findings made contrary to uncontradicted evidence
have been struck down,4 9 as has medical testimony based on facts not
supported by the evidence.5" A Deputy's acceptance or rejection of medical
testimony when there is a conflict must be based on some logical reason."
The Deputy's order must contain adequate findings of fact,52 although the
failure to do so has been held harmless error.53 Findings have been found
in substantial compliance with judicial requirements when the order demon-
strated that the Deputy had given careful consideration to the award.
54
When no proper record has been made, the full Commission may not
refer to its file in order to review the order of the Deputy, but must remand
the cause to the Deputy.5 5  Reviews by the full Commission have been
denied by the courts when the procedural requirement as to bonds for
uninsured employers has not been timely met56 and when additional grounds
have been added to the application for review after the Deputy's order
became final., 7 However, Deputies may vacate their own orders within
twenty days. 8
The court's holding that the Deputy lacked authority to grant lump
sums prior to the 1959 legislative amendment, was affirmed by virtue of
46. State v. Johnson, 118 So.2d 223 (Fla. 1960); no fee allowed on review against
successful special disability fund, James v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 116 So.2d 805 (Fla.
App. 1960); see also Miami Beach Awning Co. v. Socialis, 129 So.2d 414 (Fla. 1961).
47. Miami Beach Awning Co. v. Socialis, 129 So.2d 414 (Fla. 1961); Underwood
v. Terminal-Frouge Builders, 128 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1961); Wiedman v. Daryl Prods. Corp.,
127 So.2d 448 (Fla. 1961); Orme v. M. R. Harrison Constr. Co., 127 So.2d 104 (Fla.
1961); Cook v. Georgia Grocery, Inc., 125 So.2d 837 (Fla. 1960); Finkley v. John Raffa
Lathing, 120 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1960); Holland v. Puritan Dairy, Inc., 120 So.2d I (Fla.
1960); Booth v. Carl F. McDougald, Inc., 116 So.2d 785 (Fla. App. 1959); Berke
Displays, Inc. v. Mick, 114 So.2d 425 (Fla. App. 1959).
48. Gillespie v. Anderson, 123 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1960).
49. Standard Oil Co. v. Gay, 118 So.2d 212 (Fla. 1960).
50. Calvert v. Coral Gables First Nat'l Bank, 119 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1960).
51. Andrews v. C.B.S. Div., Maule Indus., 118 So.2d 206 (Fla. 1960).
52. Josey v. Hooper Constr. Co., 115 So.2d 183 (Fla. App. 1959).
53. Booth v. Carl F. McDougald, Inc., 116 So.2d 785 (Fla. App. 1959).
54. Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Jaeger, 119 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1960).
55. Berke Displays, Inc. v. Mick, 114 So.2d 425 (Fla. App. 1959); Hodges v. State
Road Dep't, 112 So.2d 593 (Fla. App. 1959).
56. Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Proudfoot, 116 So.2d 245 (Fla. 1959).
57. Leonard v. Cook & Pruitt Masonry, Inc., 126 So.2d 136 (Fla. 1960).
58. Mills v. aris Painting Co., 125 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1960).
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the amendment"0 giving the Deputy this authority. The court held the
amendment to be a substantive change rather than a procedural one."'
In reviewing orders of the full Commission, the supreme court has
stated that the Industrial Commission's construction of a statute is entitled
to great weight and unless cogent reasons appear, the court will not depart
therefrom.6 In order to give the court jurisdiction, there must be sufficient
finality in the order of the full Commission.
62
SINGULAR DECISIONS
The dismissal of a claim for want of prosecution can not be raised as
an adjudication on the merits. The court held in Florida Tel. Corp. v.
Oliver(3 that the employer-carrier could have presented its case when the
claimant failed to appear. In affirming a Deputy's excusing a claimant
for failure to give proper notice, the supreme court stated in Tomberlin v.
City of Miami64 that the determination of whether a claimant has prose-
cuted his claim with the degree of care of an ordinary prudent person under
similar circumstances is one of fact. Although determination of the average
weekly wage is to include, by statute, 5 a determination by the Commission
of the reasonable value of meals, the supreme court held in Bienvenido v.
Fontainebleau Hotel6" that the Deputy can only fix a value on additional
emoluments when not fixed by the employment contract, the employer
having already determined the value of the meals in this situation.
MODIFICATION
Under the act, a Deputy may review a compensation case at any time
prior to two years after the last payment of compensation or after an order
has been entered, when a change of condition or mistake in a determination
of fact can be shown.67 In Power v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc.,68 the court
held that the change of opinion of the medical expert upon whom the
Deputy originally relied was not sufficient to invoke the modification section
of the act, the mistake not having been committed by the Deputy or the
full Commission. The use of evidence which previously had been known
also was held insufficient to show a mistake of fact in Beaty V. M & S
59. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-422, § 1, at 1426, presently FLA. STAT. § 440.20(10)
(1961).
60. Sullivan v. Mayo, 121 So.2d 424 (Fla. 1960); Standard Wholesale Grocery
Co. v. Reppa, 122 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1960).
61. Miller v. Brewer Co., 122 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1960).
62. Haston v. Pix Footwear, Inc., 114 So.2d 724 (Fla. App. 1959).
63. 126 So.2d 885 (Fla. 1961).
64. 117 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1960).
65. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(12) (1961).
66. 128 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1961).
67. FLA. STAT. § 440.28 (1961).
68. 120 So.2d 443 (Fla. 1960).
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Maintenance Co.69  However, in Orme v. M. R. Harrison Constr. Co., 70
the claimant fell twenty-two feet injuring his right knee. Three years later
a claim was made for an injury to the left knee for which no claim had
previously been made and which had never been adjudicated in the prior
order. The Deputy's granting of the modification and denial of the defense
of an intervening accident was upheld by the supreme court under the
"logical cause" theory.71
THIRD PARTIES AND SUBROGATION
All of the decisions on third party actions and subrogation rights are
from the various district courts of appeal. In construing the act, the exclu-
sive remedy doctrine 72 was held to be applicable to the loss of a testicle
which is not scheduled and the loss of which manifested no loss of wage
earning capacity.7 3 The doctrine was also applied to actions by injured
employees whose cause of action was predicated on breach of warranty
rather than tort.
74
The fact that the employer was not a general contractor was held
crucial in allowing an injured employee of the owner of a convalescent home
to sue an independent contractor 75 and an employee of the City of Miami
Beach to maintain an action against the owner-operator of a crane, an inde-
pendent contractor for the city.70 The court used as an additional basis in
the latter case the inapplicability of the exclusive remedy doctrine to actions
between co-employees.
The doctrine was held applicable to an employer who under a breach
of warranty action sought to recover from the owner of a leased crane the
amount of compensation paid by the employer to his injured employees less
the amount recovered under equitable distribution.77 The employer had
participated in the damages awarded the employees in suits by these
employees against the lessor of the crane by filing its lien in accordance
with the act.7 8  The court held that the statute provides the exclusive
remedy available to the employer.
69. 124 So.2d 868 (Fla. 1960).
70. 127 So.2d 104 (Fla. 1961).
71. For the "logical cause" theory see Ortkiese v. Clarson & Ewell Eng'r, 126 So.2d
556 (Fla. 1961). The theory is not applicable to diseases or physical defects; Harris v.
Josephs, Inc., 122 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1960).
72. FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (1961).
73. Grice v. Suwannee Lumber Mfg. Go., 113 So.2d 742 (Fla. App. 1959).
74. Slack v. Acousti Eng'r Co., 122 So.2d 574 (Fla. App. 1960).
75. Floyd v. Flash Welding Co., 127 So.2d 129 (Fla. App. 1961).
76. Cromer v. Thomas, 124 So.2d 36 (Fla. App. 1960).
77. United States Gas. Co. v. F. A. Johnson, Inc., 117 So.2d 438 (Fla. App. 1960).
78. FLA. STAT. § 440.39 (1961).
1961]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
The subrogation rights of the employer or carrier are not affected by
settlement between the third party and the injured employee, 79 nor is the
subrogation lien extinguished by the settlement, the third party responsi-
bility still remaining.80 In Russell v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co.,81 no compensation
benefits were paid until after the third party claim had been settled. The
majority of the court held that the action of the carrier against the third
party could not be maintained in that no subrogation interest existed when
the settlement was made.
82
CONCLUSION
The greatest impact in the period surveyed has been on the Deputy
Commissioner. His obligation to consider all of the evidence and accept or
reject portions thereof on some logical basis has been emphasized. Most
striking, however, have been those decisions involving expert medical opinion
as not being decisive and the Deputy, rather than the medical expert, being
the only person under the act able to determine the degree of permanent
disability under both scheduled and non-scheduled injuries.
Increased activity as to claimants' attorneys' fees and the right to
have the fee assessed against the employer and carrier is also evident.
The act has remained unchanged with only minor exceptions. Here
again the change of most significance affected the Deputy Commissioner,
changing his status from a part-time officer to a full-time one.
79. Brosnahan Constr. Co. v. City of Miami Beach, 121 So.2d 827 (Fla. App.
1960); United States Cas. Co. v. Hume, 112 So.2d 49 (Fla. App. 1959).
80. Dade County v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co., 130 So.2d Ill (Fla. App. 1961);
Dickerson v. Orange State Oil Co., 123 So.2d 562 (Fla. App. 1960).
81. 128 So.2d 161 (Fla. App. 1961).
82. The law in existence at the time of the injury governs the extent of subrogation.
Aaron v. Florida Power & Light Co., 126 So.2d 889 (Fla. App. 1961); Employers Ins. Co.
v. Miller, 121 So.2d 813 (Fla. App. 1960).
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